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CASE SUMMARIES
ANNA KOURNIKOVA V. GENERAL MEDIA
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
278 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
Anna Kournikova, a professional women's tennis player,
brought suit against General Media Communications, Inc. (GMC),
publisher of Penthouse Magazine, alleging false advertising and
false endorsement.' The suit arose from GMC's publication of
partially nude photographs of another woman falsely identified as
Kournikova . The United States District Court for the Central
District of California granted GMC's motion for summary
judgment, holding that: (1) although Kournikova presented
sufficient evidence to establish that there are certain markets in
which she competes with Penthouse, she had neither alleged nor
presented evidence of any competitive injury arising from the
publication of the photographs; (2) Kournikova had not
demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to
whether a reasonable consumer might conclude that she had
voluntarily associated herself with the magazine; and (3)
Kournikova had not demonstrated that the publisher acted with
actual malice in creating the alleged false endorsement to violate
her First Amendment rights. 3
1. Koumikova v. General Media Communications, Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 1111
(C.D. Cal. 2003)
2. Id. at 1113.
3. Id. at 1111. The subject of GMC's motion for summary judgment is
Kournikova's false advertising and false endorsement claim under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, which is Kournikova's Fifth Cause of Action in her First
Amended Complaint. Id. at 1115.
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II. FACTS
The plaintiff, Anna Kournikova, is a popular and internationally
renowned women's tennis player whose annual income is also
substantially derived from her endorsement and sponsorship of
various corporations and their products.4 The defendant, GMC,
publishes and distributes Penthouse Magazine, a publication
known for its sexually explicit pictorials. GMC also maintains the
magazine's website, Penthouse.com.6 In its June 2002 issue of
Penthouse, GMC published a six-page article with pictures of a
woman sunbathing topless, identified as Kournikova.7  The
headline "EXCLUSIVE ANNA KOURNIKOVA CAUGHT
CLOSE UP ON NUDE BEACH" appeared on the magazine's
front cover, and the words "ANNA KOURNIKOVA... PET OF
THE YEAR PLAYOFF" appeared on the magazine's spine.8 The
same photographs and Kourikova's name also appeared on the
website.'
On May 7, 2002, GMC publicly admitted its error in falsely
identifying Kournikova as the woman in the pictorial, pursuant to a
complaint filed the previous day in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York by Judith Soltesz-Benetton, the
woman actually pictured in the photographs.' ° A settlement was
reached with Soltesz-Benetton on May 20, 2002, in which GMC
agreed to destroy the approximately 18,000 copies of the June
2002 edition of Penthouse Magazine still in its possession."
In the meantime, Kournikova filed suit against GMC for false
advertising and false endorsement under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.' 2 GMC moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1)
4. Id. at 1113.
5. Id. at 1114.
6. Id.
7. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1114.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1114-15.43(a) of the Lanham Act reads:
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that Kournikova lacked standing to bring a false advertising claim
because she is not a competitor; (2) that Kournikova's false
endorsement claim should be dismissed because her voluntary
association with Penthouse Magazine would not likely be believed
by any reasonable customer; and (3) that the First Amendment
bars Kournikova's false endorsement claim because, since her
denial of the photographs' authenticity was subsequently
published, Koumikova lacks evidence to show that Penthouse
intended to confuse customers regarding an association with the
magazine.1 3  The District Court granted GMC's motion for
summary judgment, focusing its ruling only on the state of the
evidence and whether genuine issues of material fact existed, and
not on the court's own views of the merits of Kournikova's
claim.14
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the use of false
designations of origin, false descriptions, and false representations
in the advertising and sale of goods and services. 5  The Act
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
13. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1115.
14. Where a motion for summary judgment has been made, the court must
decide the existence, and the moving party must demonstrate the absence, of
any genuine issues of fact exist for resolution at trial. Id. at 1115. Evidence
produced which would allow a reasonable jury to reach a verdict favoring the
non-moving party constitutes a genuine issue of fact. Id.
15. Id. at 1116 (quoting Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106 (9th
20031 455
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provides for protection against (1) unfair competition in the form
of an action for false advertising, and (2) false association in the
form of a lawsuit for false endorsement. 6 Kournikova's claim
sought recovery for both protectable interests. 7
A. Plaintiff's False Advertising Claim
The court addressed the issue of false advertising first, noting
that Kournikova's complaint did not describe a recognizable claim
for false advertising, but nevertheless discussed the plaintiff's
requirements for standing. 8 In order to assert a claim of false
advertising, a plaintiff must show that she competes with the
defendant in the sale of certain goods in some marketplace. 9
Additionally, the plaintiff must show that an evident competitive
injury has allegedly resulted from the defendant's
misrepresentation in that marketplace." Case law defines
''competitors" as "persons endeavoring to do the same thing and
each offering to perform the act, furnish the merchandise, or
Cir. 1992)) (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981)).
16. Id. at 1116-17.
17. The Fifth Cause of Action of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is
labeled as "False Endorsement and False Advertising in Violation of 15 U.S.C.
§1125." Id. at 1117.
18. Paragraph 67 of the Fifth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint states: "Defendant's false and misleading representations are likely
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection and association of Penthouse
Magazine, Penthouse.com and those media's advertisers, with Ms. Koumikova.
Defendant's false and misleading representations are likely to deceive as to the
sponsorship, endorsement, and approval of Defendant's goods and services by
Ms. Koumikova. Defendant's aforesaid acts also constitute the use of false
descriptions and false and misleading representations of fact in commercial
advertising and promotion, misrepresenting the nature, character, and quality of
Defendant's goods and services. As a result of Defendant's acts and
representations, members of the public are induced to make payments to
Defendant in the mistaken belief that its goods and services are endorsed by,
associated with, or affiliated with Ms. Koumikova." Id. at 1118.
19. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1117. (citing Halicki v. United Artists
Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987)).
20. Id. (citing Waits, 978 F.2d at 1109).
456
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render the service better or cheaper than his rival.' GMC
publishes a magazine and markets a variety of videos and
calendars which predominantly contain sexually oriented themes
and are aimed towards a male audience." Kournikova also
markets videos and calendars containing her own image, some
with arguably similar sexually oriented themes, in her secondary
career as a model.2 ' The court held that although Kournikova, a
professional athlete, and GMC, a publisher, are technically
engaged in what appear to be distinctly different businesses, they
are nonetheless both involved in the business of entertainment, and
are thus competitors "for the same dollars from the same target
audience" with respect to at least some of their commercial
activities.24
Continuing its analysis of false advertising, the court also
accepted GMC's argument that, notwithstanding Koumikova's
ability to demonstrate competition, she did not present evidence of
a competitive injury. 5 In order to prove a "discernible competitive
injury," Kournikova would have to bring evidence of a measurable
decline in calendar, exercise video and other product sales during
the period in which the June 2002 Penthouse issue was available
for consumer purchase, as well as evidence to show that those
drops in sales were connected to the publication of the June 2002
Penthouse issue.26  Because Kournikova presented no such
evidence and even conceded that her current endorsement
agreements had neither been terminated nor rescinded as a result
of the June 2002 Penthouse issue's publication, the court granted
GMC's motion for summary judgment on Kournikova's false
advertising claim. 7
21. Id. (citing Summit Tech v. High-line Med. Instruments Co., 933 F. Supp.
918, 937 (C.D. Cal. 1996)(quoting Fuller Bros. v. Int'l Mktg., 870 F. Supp. 299,
303 (D. Or. 1994)).
22. Id. at 1118.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1118-19.
26. Id. at 1119.
27. Id.
2003] 457
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B. Plaintiff's False Endorsement Claim
Next, the court addressed the issue of false endorsement. In its
analysis, the court discussed: (1) the requirements for standing, (2)
the likelihood of consumer confusion as a determinative issue, and
(3) the need to demonstrate actual malice.28  In order to
successfully claim false endorsement on the basis of non-
permissive use of a celebrity's identity, the plaintiff is faced with a
substantially lesser burden since a showing of actual competition is
not required.29 Standing requires only that the parties have "a
commercial interest in the product wrongfully identified with
another's mark... or with a commercial interest in the misused
mark. '3' Thus, the court found that Kournikova clearly had
standing to pursue a false endorsement claim where her interest in
the exploitation of her name and likeness is obvious, and where
GMC's wrongful use of her name and likeness to promote a
product with which she was not associated advanced the likelihood
of commercial injury.31
Because the images and identities of celebrities are commonly
used in newspapers and magazines in the absence of endorsement
contracts, such use does not create an inference of endorsement.32
Thus, the determinative issue in false endorsement claims under
the Lanham Act is the likelihood of consumer confusion with
regard to the use of the names and likenesses of celebrities.33 Two
elements define the Lanham Act's standard for the existence of
consumer confusion: (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
identity with regard to defendant's product; and (2) a finding that
this use suggests the plaintiffs sponsorship or approval of that
28. Id. at 1119-30
29. ld. at 1119-20.
30. Id. at 1120 (quoting Waits, 978 F.2d at 1109).
31. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1120.
32. See Abdul-Jabbar v. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1996).
33. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1120 (citing Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,
292 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)).
458
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product.34 Because of the standard's factual nature, the court must
refer to the entire record in order to measure the likelihood of
consumer confusion.35 The first element was readily established
by GMC's publication of Kournikova's name and purported
likeness.
The court's assessment of the second element - whether the use
of Koumikova's name suggested her sponsorship or approval of
GMC's magazine - required a more thorough examination of a set
of factors to determine the likelihood of confusion:36 (1) the level
of the plaintiff's recognition among the product's intended market
segment;37 (2) the relatedness of the plaintiffs fame or success to
the defendant's product;38 (3) the similarity of the likeness used by
the defendant to the plaintiff;39 (4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) the marketing channels used;4" (6) the likely degree of
purchaser care;4" (7) the defendant's intent in selecting the
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997);
Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997)).
36. Id.; see also Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007-1008
(9th Cir. 2001) (restating the factors set forth in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) to make them more applicable to celebrity cases).
37. Id. at 1121. Both Kournikova and GMC agreed that Koumikova is a
famous celebrity/athlete with a mark which is highly recognized by the public.
Id. See also YKK Corp. v. Jungwoo Zipper Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200
(C.D. Cal. 2002)("A mark with extensive public recognition and renown
deserves and receives more legal protection than an obscure or weak mark.").
38. The court found that although the parties are engaged in different
businesses, evidence showed that they do compete in certain markets, where
their endeavors overlap as members of the entertainment business. Kournikova,
278 F.Supp.2d at 1121.
39. GMC's use of Kournikova's name in the June 2002 issue of Penthouse
was undisputed. Id. at 1121.
40. There must be a substantial likelihood of competition. Id. at 1126. See
also supra note 37.
41. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1126. (citing Brookfield Communs., Inc.
v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999); Sleekcraft,
599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979) (A "reasonably prudent customer" serves as
the basis for determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.)). The court
found that neither GMC, asserting that customers are less likely to purchase a
magazine with candid photos (of supposed inferior quality) than one containing
2003] 459
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plaintiff;42 and (8) the likelihood of expansion of the defendant's
product lines.43 In an effort to prove actual confusion, Kournikova
offered evidence including expert testimony regarding
examination of the language on the magazine's front cover, the
existence of a class action suit by disgruntled Penthouse readers
who were disappointed to learn that the photographs of
Kournikova in the June 2002 issue were not authentic, and a
survey assessing consumer perceptions. 4' The court found that
Kournikova's offerings did not provide real evidence of actual
confusion: the conclusions of the language expert's report were
unsupported and therefore created no genuine issues of material
fact,45 the class action plaintiffs did not show that they believed
posed photos, nor Kournikova, arguing that a jury should decide on the amount
of care used by the average Penthouse customer, provided substantial support
for their positions. Id. at 1126.
42. The court found that GMC "knowingly" used Kournikova's mark in
attempting to increase profits in the sale of its June 2002 issue. Id. at 1127.
43. The court found little likelihood where Kournikova has stated that she
does not intend to enter the adult entertainment market and "has gone to great
lengths to disassociate herself with Penthouse." Id.
44. Id. at 1121-26.
45. In an attempt to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding actual
confusion, Kournikova hired Dr. Peter Tiersma to examine the language on the
June 2002 magazine cover and spine. His analysis concentrated on the use of
the word "caught" in the cover headline "EXCLUSIVE ANNA
KOURNIKOVA CAUGHT CLOSE UP ON NUDE BEACH." Dr. Tiersma
concluded that the word's use in connection to photography could be interpreted
to suggest Kournikova's cooperation. He also argued that the meaning of
"caught" is altered in the context of hard core pornographic Internet sites, where
"caught" is used to describe photos in which the women are looking directly
into the camera "and are clearly posing." However, the court found that the
examples of instances where "caught" is used in a photographic sense were
found to support GMC's assertion that readers would perceive the photographs
as "snapshots" taken without the subject's permission. The court also found that
the average Penthouse Magazine reader would not necessarily believe
Kournikova was "caught" nude in the same way that pornography stars are
"caught" nude. Furthermore, the court found that Dr. Tiersma's study was
flawed because it failed to: (1) review the magazine as a whole, (2) offer a
dictionary definition suggesting that "caught" is synonymous with cooperation,
and (3) show that a reasonable consumer would be likely to conclude
460
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that Kournikova had voluntarily posed for or endorsed the
magazine," and the sampling technique of the survey was flawed
and thus non-probative.47 In weighing the remaining factors, the
court found that Koumikova was only able to assert at most a
possibility, rather than a likelihood, of consumer confision.48
Continuing its analysis of false endorsement, the court
considered whether GMC acted with actual malice to violate
Kournikova's First Amendment rights.49 The court noted that the
standard is "a knowing or reckless creation of false impression."50
Mere negligence is not sufficient to show actual malice.51
However, actual malice may be inferred from an accumulation of
evidence that supports the inference of the defendant's intent."
Thus, unless a public figure can produce clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice in creating the
false impression of endorsement, the First Amendment bars the
Kournikova's endorsement of the magazine. Id. at 1122-24.
46. The court found that while the class action may show that the plaintiffs
purchased the June 2002 issue of Penthouse Magazine under a hope or belief
that it actually contained Kournikova's pictures, the value of this showing is not
persuasive. Id. at 1124.
47. At Kournikova's request, the survey was designed and conducted to test
GMC's assertion that, based on the magazine's cover, "no reasonable
consumer.. .would believe that Plaintiff had voluntarily associated herself with
Penthouse magazine." However, the sample consumer group did not
appropriately represent "the average Penthouse customer" and were not asked to
examine the magazine a whole, but rather were only allowed to look at digital
images of the cover and spine. Thus, along with the survey's failure to establish
a likelihood that a consumer might believe that Koumikova and the magazine
were associated, the court found that the flaws in the survey's sampling
techniques rendered it inadmissible. Id. at 1124-26.
48. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1127-28.
49. Id. at 1128.
50. Id. at 1129 (quoting Solano v. Playgirl, Inc. 292 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th
Cir. 2002))
51. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187
(9th Cir. 2001)).
52. Id. (citing Solano, 292 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 692 F.2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982)).
2003]
9
Palacio: Anna Kournikova v. General Media Communications, Inc. 278 F.Supp.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART & ENT. LAW [Vol. XIII:453
plaintiff's claim. 3
Here, the cover and article relating to Kournikova in the June
2002 Penthouse issue were not simple advertisements. 4
Notwithstanding the fact that the photographs were actually of
another woman identified as Kournikova, the reality that
Kournikova did not pose for the photographs and the magazine's
headline indicated that she had been "caught," demonstrated the
non-commercial nature of the pictorial. As non-commercial
speech, the court concluded that the article and the accompanying
picture in the magazine were entitled to full First Amendment
protection.5 Kournikova failed to produce any evidence from
which the court could have inferred that GMC intentionally
designed the June 2002 Penthouse issue in a way that was likely to
confuse the average reader into believing that she had either
endorsed or was associated with the magazine. 6 Neither did
Kournikova produce clear and convincing evidence from which a
jury could have concluded that GMC acted with actual malice in
creating a false impression of endorsement. 7 Thus, the court
granted GMC's motion for summary judgment on Kournikova's
false endorsement claim. 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Kournikova brought two claims, false advertising and false
endorsement, against GMC for its publication of her purported
photographs in its June 2002 issue of Penthouse magazine and on
its website, Penthouse.com, under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
53. Id.
54. Kournikova, 278 F.Supp.2d at 1128-29.
55. Id. at 1128.
56. Id. at 1129.
57. Id. at 1130.
58. Furthermore, the court denied Kournikova's request for additional time to
conduct discovery under Rule 56(f) because she did not indicate how further
discovery might reveal a genuine issue of material fact for trial, nor did she
properly file a motion under the rule; mere mention of the motion was
insufficient. Id. at 1130; FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
462
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Act. In order to have standing for her claim of false advertising,
Kournikova was required to show that GMC's publication of the
pictorial in its June 2002 issue of Penthouse Magazine caused her
an apparent competitive injury. To succeed under that claim,
Kournikova needed to establish that GMC's publication was likely
to confuse consumers by demonstrating the existence of genuine
issues of fact as to whether or not a reasonable consumer might
conclude that she had voluntarily associated herself with
Penthouse Magazine. Furthermore, to prevent her false
endorsement claim from being barred by the First Amendment,
Koumikova needed to clearly show that GMC intended to confuse
consumers into believing that Kournikova voluntarily posed for
the photographs and endorsed its publication, and that GMC acted
with malice in publishing the pictorial. Because Koumikova did
not satisfy her burden of proof on either claim, GMC was entitled
to summary judgment.
Melodia R. Palacio
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